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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
TWENTIETH, JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR LEE COUNTY FLORIDA
CASE NO: 15-031538DR N
DIVISION: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

Randy A Scott)
Respondent)
)
v.)
)
Frederic A Blum)
Petitioner)

*** MOTION TO TAX COSTS***

On July 16, 2015 this petitioner filed a petition seeking to enjoin respondent from speaking about him. This court granted the petition. On April 29, 2016 the Second District Court of Appeals issued an order reversing. On May 17, 2016 the Second District Court of Appeals issued its mandate of reversal. (exhibit 1 and 2)

Authorities:

> Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400(a) provides, in part:
> (a) Costs. Costs shall be taxed in favor of the prevailing party unless the court orders otherwise. . . . Costs shall be taxed by the lower tribunal on motion served within 30 days after issuance of the mandate.
>
> IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT FIRST PROTECTIVE INSURANCE) COMPANY,)) Appellant,)) v.) Case No. 2D06-5445) HISAKO FEATHERSTON and) CATHERINE THORNHILL, individually) and as parent and natural guardian of) Hannah Elizabeth Thornhill, a minor (Exhibit 3)
>
> IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA CASE NO. 1D11-2941 Thomas Giddens v. Therese Tlsty (exhibit 4)

Respondent substantially prevailed and according to 9.400 is entitled to appeals costs as follows:

1. Preparation of transcript (exhibit 5) $504.00
2. Preparation of record (exhibit 6) $435.50

Total costs requested to be taxed to petitioner $939.50



Randy A Scott
343 Hazelwood Ave S
Lehigh Acres , Florida 33936
randy@randyscott.us
239.300.7007

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above has been entered into Florida eportal and therefore served by rule on opposing party(ies) this 19th day of May 2016.

EXHIBIT 1

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

RANDY A. SCOTT, Appellant, v. FREDERIC A. BLUM, Appellee.	)	Case No. 2D15-3412

Opinion filed April 29, 2016.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lee County; R. Thomas Corbin, Judge.

Randy A. Scott, pro se.

Jeremy J. Kroll of Bogenschutz, Dutko & Kroll, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellee.

BLACK, Judge.

Randy Scott challenges the order enjoining him from cyberstalking. He contends that the petitioner below, Frederic A. Blum, failed to provide evidence of the statutory elements required for entry of an injunction against cyberstalking. Mr. Scott also contends that the order is overly broad and impedes his First Amendment right to

free speech. We agree that Mr. Blum failed to meet his evidentiary burden and reverse. As a result, we do not reach the First Amendment issue.

Mr. Blum filed a petition for injunction for protection against cyberstalking. Mr. Blum is a process server and a member of the National Association of Professional Process Servers (NAPPS). Mr. Scott is a former process server and former member of NAPPS. At the hearing on the petition, Mr. Blum testified that Mr. Scott sent emails about Mr. Blum and Mr. Blum's family, partners, and former employees to 2200 NAPPS members. The emails consisted of links to articles, blog posts, or videos. In some instances, the articles or blog posts were written by Mr. Scott. The tenor of the emails, articles, blog posts, and videos was derogatory, and the allegations within them were potentially damaging to Mr. Blum's business and reputation. Copies of the emails supported Mr. Blum's testimony.

Mr. Blum testified that none of the emails were sent directly to him but that he knows about them because they were forwarded by the recipients to him or he received phone calls about them. The emails, articles, blog posts, and videos did not contain threats against Mr. Blum. However, Mr. Blum claimed that the content of the emails, articles, blog posts, and videos caused him emotional distress; he had trouble sleeping and eating, the emails were constantly on his mind, and he constantly had to defend himself to people.

Mr. Scott testified that his emails discussed many people within NAPPS or connected to NAPPS and were not directed at Mr. Blum.

The trial court granted the injunction without findings or conclusions. The order is a form order with no conditions specific to the facts of this case.[1]

Section 784.0485(1), Florida Statutes (2014), provides that "[f]or the purposes of injunctions for protection against stalking under this section, the offense of stalking shall include the offense of cyberstalking." Section 784.048(1)(d) defines cyberstalking as "engag[ing] in a course of conduct to communicate, or to cause to be communicated, words, images, or language by or through the use of electronic mail or electronic communication, directed at a specific person, causing substantial emotional distress to that person and serving no legitimate purpose." Harassment is "a course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress . . . and serves no legitimate purpose." § 784.048(1)(a). Thus, cyberstalking is harassment via electronic communications. See Murphy v. Reynolds, 55 So. 3d 716, 717 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). In order to succeed in a petition for injunction against cyberstalking, the petitioner must establish that a series of electronic communications directed at the petitioner caused substantial emotional distress and served no legitimate purpose. "Whether a communication causes substantial emotional distress should be narrowly construed and is governed by the reasonable person standard." David v. Textor, 41 Fla. L. Weekly D131, D132 (Fla. 4th DCA Jan. 6, 2016); accord Leach v. Kersey, 162 So. 3d 1104, 1106 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) ("In determining whether substantial emotional

[1]When counsel for Mr. Blum inquired as to whether the injunction would require Mr. Scott to remove existing articles, blog posts, and videos, the court responded, "I'm done. I granted the petition. That's all I can say. That's all I can do." When Mr. Scott then asked, "What can I and can't I do?" the court responded, "I don't give legal advice. I just grant or deny petitions. I granted it."

distress occurred, the courts look to the standard of a reasonable person in the petitioner's shoes.").

"[W]here comments are made on an electronic medium to be read by others, they cannot be said to be directed to a particular person." David, 41 Fla. L. Weekly at D132 (citing Chevaldina v. R.K./FL Mgmt., Inc., 133 So. 3d 1086, 1091-92 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)). In Horowitz v. Horowitz, 160 So. 3d 530, 531 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015), this court stated:

> Mr. Horowitz's Facebook posts do not meet the statutory definition of cyberstalking for two reasons. First, the posts were not "directed at a specific person." § 784.048(1)(d). The testimony showed that Mr. Horowitz posted the information to his own Facebook page. Screenshots of the posts admitted into evidence confirm that they were posted to Mr. Horowitz's page and that Mrs. Horowitz was not "tagged" or mentioned, nor were the posts directed to her in any obvious way.

Likewise, the emails here do not meet the statutory definition of cyberstalking. The emails were not "addressed" to Mr. Blum, and nothing indicates that Mr. Blum was an intended recipient. Cf. Branson v. Rodriguez-Linares, 143 So. 3d 1070, 1071 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (concluding that sending more than 300 emails to the petitioner constituted evidence of stalking); Bacchus v. Bacchus, 108 So. 3d 712, 715 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) ("Even harassment of the wife through third parties would be insufficient to warrant the imposition or extension of an injunction.").

Mr. Scott did not communicate words, images, or language via email or electronic communication directly to Mr. Blum. Cf. Thoma v. O'Neal, 180 So. 3d 1157, 1160 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) ("We . . . agree with the trial court that sending the flyer to the Victim's home was an incident of harassing behavior."). The videos do not constitute

evidence of the communication of "words, images, or language . . . directed at a specific person, causing substantial emotional distress to that person." See Chevaldina, 133 So. 3d at 1091-92 (quoting § 784.048(1)(d)). The emails sent to 2200 NAPPS members do not constitute words "directed at a specific person" for purposes of the cyberstalking statute simply because they are about Mr. Blum. See David, 41 Fla. L. Weekly at D132. Nor did Mr. Scott "cause to be communicated" words, images, or language via email or electronic communication to Mr. Blum.

Further, "[t]hat [the articles and videos] may be embarrassing to [Mr. Blum] is not at all the same as causing him substantial emotional distress sufficient to obtain an injunction." See id. The same is true for the emails sent to the NAPPS members. Mr. Scott did not make any threats to Mr. Blum's safety. See id. Mr. Blum's distress relates to his business reputation and personal reputation among his colleagues. A reasonable person would not suffer substantial emotional distress over the emails, articles, blog posts, and videos at issue. That the articles written by Mr. Scott contain false allegations or embarrassing information is not a basis for a cyberstalking injunction.

> Angry social media postings are now common. Jilted lovers, jilted tenants, and attention-seeking bloggers spew their anger into fiber-optic cables and cyberspace. But analytically, and legally, these rants are essentially the electronic successors of the pre-blog, solo complainant holding a poster on a public sidewalk in front of an auto dealer that proclaimed, "DON'T BUY HERE! ONLY LEMONS FROM THESE CROOKS!" Existing and prospective customers of the auto dealership considering such a poster made up their minds based on their own experience and research. If and when a hypothetical complainant with the poster walked into the showroom and harangued individual customers, or threatened violence, however, the previously-protected opinion crossed the border into the land of

> trespass, business interference, and amenability to tailored injunctive relief. The same well-developed body of law allows the complaining blogger to complain, with liability for money damages for defamation if the complaints are untruthful and satisfy the elements of that cause of action. Injunctive relief to prohibit such complaints is another matter altogether.

Chevaldina, 133 So. 3d at 1092 (addressing an order enjoining tortious interference, stalking, trespass, and defamatory blogs).

Reversed.

NORTHCUTT and SLEET, JJ., Concur.

Exhibit 2

M A N D A T E

from

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

THIS CAUSE HAVING BEEN BROUGHT TO THIS COURT BY APPEAL, AND AFTER DUE CONSIDERATION THE COURT HAVING ISSUED ITS OPINION;

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED THAT SUCH FURTHER PROCEEDINGS BE HAD IN SAID CAUSE, IF REQUIRED, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE OPINION OF THIS COURT ATTACHED HERETO AND INCORPORATED AS PART OF THIS ORDER, AND WITH THE RULES OF PROCEDURE AND LAWS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA.

WITNESS THE HONORABLE CRAIG C. VILLANTI CHIEF JUDGE OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, SECOND DISTRICT, AND THE SEAL OF THE SAID COURT AT LAKELAND, FLORIDA ON THIS DAY.

DATE: May 17, 2016

SECOND DCA CASE NO. 2D15-3412

COUNTY OF ORIGIN: Lee

LOWER TRIBUNAL CASE NO. 15-DR-31538

CASE STYLE: RANDY A. SCOTT v. FREDERIC A. BLUM

Mary Elizabeth Kuenzel

Mary Elizabeth Kuenzel
Clerk

cc: (Without Attached Opinion)

Jeremy J. Kroll, Esq. Randy A. Scott

mep

Exhibit 3

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

FIRST PROTECTIVE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. HISAKO FEATHERSTON and CATHERINE THORNHILL, individually and as parent and natural guardian of Hannah Elizabeth Thornhill, a minor, Appellees.	)	Case No. 2D06-5445

Opinion filed January 23, 2008.

Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Hillsborough County;
James D. Arnold, Judge.

Caryn L. Bellus and Kubicki Draper,
Miami, for Appellant.

Raymond T. Elligett, Jr., of Buell &
Elligett, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee
Hisako Featherston.

Lee D. Gunn, IV, and Scott A. Arthur
of Gunn Law Group, P.A., Tampa,
for Appellee Catherine Thornhill.

EN BANC

CANADY, Judge.

In this case we consider whether a litigant's failure to plead entitlement to costs constitutes a waiver of the litigant's right to file a motion seeking costs at the conclusion of the litigation. Pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.331(a) and (c), the court on its own motion has ordered en banc consideration of this case. For the reasons we explain, we hold that litigants are not required to claim entitlement to costs in their pleadings.

At issue here is the circuit court's order denying appellant First Protective Insurance Company's motion to tax costs, which was filed after entry of judgment in a declaratory judgment action instituted by First Protective against the appellees. In the declaratory judgment action, First Protective prevailed in obtaining a declaration that the homeowner's liability insurance policy it issued did not provide the coverage claimed by the appellees. See First Protective Ins. Co. v. Featherston, 906 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). In its motion to tax costs, First Protective asserted an entitlement to costs pursuant to section 57.041, Florida Statutes (2005), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.525.

The appellees argued to the trial court that First Protective's failure to plead entitlement to costs foreclosed an award of costs. It was undisputed that First Protective had not asserted a claim for costs in its complaint. First Protective argued that there is no requirement that entitlement to costs be asserted as a claim in the pleadings. The trial court accepted the appellees' argument on this point and entered the order denying the motion to tax costs. In support of the denial of costs, the trial

court's order cited two cases: Stockman v. Downs, 573 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1991), and Mook v. Mook, 873 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).

Stockman, 573 So. 2d at 837-38, held "that a claim for attorneys fees, whether based on statute or contract, must be pled" and that the "[f]ailure to do so constitutes a waiver of the claim" for fees. In reaching this decision, the court rejected the numerous "decisions of the district courts of appeal [which] held that it is unnecessary to plead for attorney's fees authorized by statute," id. at 836, as well as those cases which had allowed "recovery of attorney's fees pursuant to a contract even though the claimant did not plead entitlement to such fees," id. at 837. The Stockman court based its decision on the need for appropriate notice:

> The fundamental concern is one of notice. Modern pleading requirements serve to notify the opposing party of the claims alleged and prevent unfair surprise. Raising entitlement to attorney's fees only after judgment fails to serve either of those objectives. The existence or nonexistence of a motion for attorney's fees may play an important role in decisions affecting a case . . . . A party should not have to speculate throughout the entire course of an action about what claims ultimately may be alleged against him.

Id. (citation omitted).

In Mook, 873 So. 2d at 365, we reversed the award of *attorney's fees* and *costs* to the husband in a dissolution action "because the Husband never pleaded entitlement to attorney's fees or costs." The analysis in Mook is based entirely on the reasoning of Stockman with respect to claims for attorney's fees. There is no indication in Mook that the husband suggested that costs should be treated differently than attorneys' fees.

Contrary to the appellees' argument, we conclude that the rationale articulated in Stockman for requiring that litigants plead entitlement to attorney's fees should not be applied to impose a similar requirement with respect to costs. Accordingly, we recede from Mook to the extent it is inconsistent with our holding here.

In Globe Auto Imports, Inc. v. Golden, 567 So. 2d 899, 900 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), we held that the failure of a party to assert a claim for costs in the pleadings did not preclude an award of costs to that party. In support of our holding on this point, we cited Oriental Imports, Inc. v. Alilin, 559 So. 2d 442, 442 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), which held that under section 57.041, a trial judge does not have "discretion to deny recovery of costs to the prevailing party." Oriental Imports recognized that under section 57.041, " 'every party who recovers a judgment in a legal proceeding is entitled as a matter of right to recover lawful court costs.' " 559 So. 2d at 443 (quoting Governing Bd. of St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Lake Pickett Ltd., 543 So. 2d 883, 884 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)).

The holding of Globe Auto Imports is consistent with the principle recognized by the supreme court in State ex rel. Royal Insurance Co. v. Barrs, 99 So. 668, 669 (Fla. 1924), that costs which are recoverable "as an incident to the main adjudication are ordinarily not required to be specifically claimed in the pleadings." See also Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Crossdale, 585 So. 2d 481, 483 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) ("Costs are quite simply part of general relief. All pleadings are understood to pray for general relief and are construed to do substantial justice."); Arellano v. Bisson, 761 So. 2d 365, 366 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (quoting Crossdale); Philip J. Padovano, Florida Civil Practice § 13.3, at 469 (2007) ("Because the costs are an

incident of the proceeding itself, there is no need to plead a claim for costs to preserve the right to recover at the time of the judgment.").

In Estate of Brock, 695 So. 2d 714, 716 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), a case involving probate proceedings, the First District considered whether the "rule on attorney's fees pronounced in Stockman . . . should be construed as applying equally to cost awards." The appellant argued that the award of costs to the appellee was precluded because the appellee did not request costs from the appellant in the petition originally filed by the appellee. The court stated that the appellant had "failed to provide either statutory or case law holding that costs may not be awarded in probate litigation unless pled" and that the court's "independent research [had] not disclosed authority for this proposition." Id. The court stated that "[g]enerally, costs are considered an incident to the action and need not be claimed in the pleadings." Id. The Brock court thus rejected the application of Stockman to claims for costs.

In considering the appropriate pleading requirements, there is a material difference between attorney's fees and costs. Unlike costs, ordinarily attorney's fees are not recoverable and thus are not at issue. There is no generally applicable statute which entitles a prevailing party to a recovery of attorney's fees. Accordingly, where there is a statutory or contractual basis for an award of attorney's fees, proper pleading requires that a party seeking attorney's fees put the other party or parties on notice that attorney's fees are at issue in the litigation.

Under section 57.041, the recovery of costs is generally available to any "party recovering judgment." This general provision may be displaced by context-specific statutory costs provisions. For example, in declaratory judgment proceedings,

section 86.081, Florida Statutes (2005), provides that "[t]he court may award costs as are equitable." And in dissolution cases, section 61.16, Florida Statutes (2005), provides that "a reasonable amount" may be awarded for the costs of a party "after considering the financial resources of both parties." Although the standard for the award of costs may—based on specific statutory provisions—vary from the general standard set forth in section 57.041, it is universally true that costs are at issue when a lawsuit is brought. The availability of a recovery of costs is part of the warp and woof of litigation. Every party to litigation enters the litigation on notice that costs are at issue. Given this reality, it is unnecessary to require that litigants assert a claim for costs in the pleadings.[1]

We therefore conclude that the trial court erred in its denial of the motion to tax costs. On remand, the trial court shall determine the issue of costs under section 86.081, which governs the award of costs in declaratory judgment actions. The circumstance that First Protective's motion to tax costs made reference to section 57.041—which is not applicable in the context of a declaratory judgment action—rather than to section 86.081, does not preclude an award of costs under the governing statutory provision. See Wilson Ins. Servs. v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 608 So. 2d 857, 858 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Hemmerle v. Bramalea, 547 So. 2d 203, 204 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989).

The trial court's order is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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[1] Our conclusion on this point is supported by the omission of a prayer for recovery of costs from all the form complaints in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 1.900(b) provides that these form complaints "are sufficient for the matters that are covered by them." None of the form complaints contains any reference to costs. See Fla. R. Civ.

Reversed and remanded.

NORTHCUTT, C.J., and ALTENBERND, FULMER, WHATLEY, CASANUEVA, SALCINES, STRINGER, DAVIS, SILBERMAN, KELLY, VILLANTI, WALLACE, and LaROSE, JJ., Concur.

P. 1.932-1.951.

Exhibit 4

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

THOMAS GIDDENS,

Appellant,

v.

THERESA TLSTY,

Appellee.

_____/

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D11-2941

Opinion filed October 5, 2012.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County.
Robert Groeb, Judge.

Thomas Giddens, pro se, Appellant.

Theresa Tlsty, pro se, Appellee.

ON APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR REVIEW OF
LOWER TRIBUNAL'S DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S MOTION
TO TAX APPELLATE COSTS

BENTON, C.J.

Thomas Giddens seeks review of the order denying the motion to tax appellate costs he filed in circuit court pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400(a). We grant his motion for review, reverse the circuit court's order, and remand for further proceedings.

In the main appeal, Mr. Giddens challenged a final injunction for protection against repeat violence, entered against him at the behest of Theresa Tlsty pursuant to section 784.046(2), Florida Statutes (2011). On grounds that competent, substantial evidence did not support the final injunction, we reversed. Giddens v. Tlsty, 87 So. 3d 843 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). Four days after the mandate issued, Mr. Giddens filed a motion in the trial court to tax appellate costs pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400(a).[1] In the order under review, the trial court denied the motion, on the mistaken ground that it was without jurisdiction to award appellate costs. We now grant the motion for review of the order denying appellate costs. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.400(c).[2]

In granting the motion for review, we reverse the trial court's July 25, 2012 order denying the motion to tax appellate costs. Motions to tax "appellate costs cannot be filed in the district court but must be filed in the lower tribunal after

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[1] Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400(a) provides, in part:

> (a) Costs. Costs shall be taxed in favor of the prevailing party unless the court orders otherwise. . . . Costs shall be taxed by the lower tribunal on motion served within 30 days after issuance of the mandate.

[2] Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400(c) provides, in part:

> (c) Review. Review of orders rendered by the lower tribunal under this rule shall be by motion filed in the court within 30 days of rendition.

jurisdiction has been returned to that body by our mandate." Superior Prot., Inc. v. Martinez, 930 So. 2d 859, 860 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). So long as the motion to tax appellate costs is timely, costs must be taxed in favor of the party who prevailed on the appeal. See Martin v. Hialeah Hous. Auth., 972 So. 2d 1113, 1114 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) ("Under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400(a), a party may serve a motion to tax costs within thirty days after the issuance of the mandate. Thus, by its terms, rule 9.400(a) authorizes proceedings for appellate costs to take place after the mandate has issued."); Moran Towing of Fla., Inc. v. Mays, 623 So. 2d 850, 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (noting the trial court has jurisdiction pursuant to rule 9.400(a) for consideration of a motion for taxation of appellate costs "for 30 days following issuance of mandate without an order or directions from this court"); Jackson v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 433 So. 2d 1367, 1368 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (concluding the lower tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain a motion to tax appellate costs because the motion to tax appellate costs was served within thirty days after the issuance of the mandate). We remand for proceedings pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400(a), to fix and tax the costs of the appeal against Theresa Tlsty, the unsuccessful appellee.

Reversed and remanded.

WETHERELL and RAY, JJ., CONCUR.

Exhibit 5

INVOICE

VON AHN ASSOCIATES, INC.
COURT REPORTING

Invoice No.	Invoice Date	Job No.
110599	8/31/2015	95284
Job Date	**Case No.**	
8/4/2015	15-031538DR N	
Case Name		
Blum v. Scott		
Payment Terms		
Due upon receipt		

Randy A. Scott, Pro Se
Randy A. Scott, Pro Se
343 Hazelwood Avenue S
Lehigh Acres, FL 33936

Original and One Copy of the Court Smart CD Recorded Hearing Before		
Judge R. Thomas Corbin	90.00 Pages	504.00
Word Index		0.00
	TOTAL DUE >>>	**$504.00**

Thank you. We appreciate your business.
Von Ahn Associates
(239) 332-7443

Reporter: JDB

(-) Payments/Credits:	504.00
(+) Finance Charges/Debits:	0.00
(=) New Balance:	**$0.00**

Tax ID: 06-1642139 Phone: 239-300-7007 Fax:

Please detach bottom portion and return with payment.

Randy A. Scott, Pro Se
Randy A. Scott, Pro Se
343 Hazelwood Avenue S
Lehigh Acres, FL 33936

Invoice No. : 110599
Invoice Date : 8/31/2015
Total Due : $ 0.00

Remit To: **Von Ahn Associates, Inc.**
2271 McGregor Boulevard
Second Floor
Fort Myers, FL 33901

Job No. : 95284
BU ID : Main
Case No. : 15-031538DR N
Case Name : Blum v. Scott

Exhibit 6

INVOICE

10000252499734

Lee County Clerk of Courts

Transaction Date
09/22/2015

Description	Amount To Be Paid

Scott, Randy Allen
15-DR-031538
Blum, Frederic A
Petitioner
vs
Scott, Randy Allen
Respondent

Appeal Prep (Index)	49.00
Appeal Prep (Items)	339.50
Copy Work	22.00
Payment Plan Set-Up Fee	25.00
INVOICE TOTAL	**435.50**
Amount To Be Paid	435.50
Balance Due After Payment	0.00

Printed 09/22/2015 2:01 PM jc2cvl28 Audit 252499734

INVOICE